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The Computer Misuse Act is the primary law in the UK for
computer crime. Its provisions are broad and have yet to be
claried by case law, in a way which could cause problems
for a researcher. This paper describes the Act, and analyses
some of the possible consequences for researchers.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Computing Milieux]: Public Policy Issues|Abuse
and crime involving computers
1. BACKGROUND
Estimates as to the eects of cybercrime on the Web vary
wildly. As an example, the report commissioned by the UK
Cabinet Oce from Detica as to the cost of cybercrime es-
timated the annual cost to the UK as high as $27bn[4],
some 1.8% of GDP. Anderson et al. by contrast declined
to provide a rm estimate of overall cost due to insucient
data being available, though they did estimate that the g-
ure was likely to be considerably less than that in the De-
tica report[2]. In a more technological sense, the Spoofer
project
1 from MIT estimated IP spoong was possible in
23% of networks; whereas only the annual Trustwave survey
consistently has a far lower number
2.
A lot of the data about cybercrime comes from surveys,
which have their own set of diculties for extrapolating re-
sults. Flor^ encio & Herley presented a strong assessment of
cybercrime surveys, as being \so compromised and biased
that no faith whatever can be placed in their ndings"[5].
Amongst the diculties was the diculties from the con-
centration of the victims in the population, and the con-
centration of the losses within the victims requiring survey
1http://spoofer.cmand.org/
2IP packets have a source and destination address, so the
response to a request can go back to the source. By spoong
the source, it is possible to mount a denial of service attack
by sending unwanted trac to a victim
sizes to be massive in order to ensure a reasonable degree of
statistical accuracy. In addition, the tendency for inaccura-
cies in self-reported gures, and our inability to check the
accuracy of responses cast further doubt on the validity[5].
These weaknesses, they argue, have led to many survey re-
sults being potentially an order of magnitude out.
Despite their limitations, a survey can arguably provide
some insight into the problem. Nevertheless, a Web Sci-
ence researcher should seek other, more objective methods
of research in order to provide evidence for how much faith
can be placed in these surveys. This may occasionally re-
quire participants to be misled and either obtain retrospec-
tive consent if it's possible, or not if it isn't. Whilst this is a
strategy which is occasionally required in other more tradi-
tional disciplines, in activity related to the Web care needs
to be taken to not fall afoul of computer misuse legislation,
since interfering with data on someone's computer is an of-
fence in most countries. This paper will provide an outline
of some of the issues relating to the Computer Misuse Act
in the UK, and things a researcher should consider before
conducting an experiment.
2. COMPUTER MISUSE LEGISLATION
The CMA is based around the notion of \Unauthorised Ac-
cess", with s1 providing as follows:
1. A person is guilty of an oence if
(a) He causes a computer to perform any function with
intent to secure access to any program or data or
enable such access to be secured
(b) The access he intends to secure... is unauthorized
(c) He knows at the time... that that is the case
This is designed to be interpreted in an extremely broad
fashion as illustrated by the interpretation guide in s17.
S17(2)(d) provides that data is accessed\has it output from
the computer in which it is held (whether by having it dis-
played or in any other manner); ", and s17(4)(b) provides
that \the form in which any such instructions or any other
data is output... is immaterial". As such, this would sug-
gest that visiting a website is in itself securing access, and
therefore without the owner's consent then one would be
committing a s1 oence under the CMA. In order to as-
certain whether visiting a website would be contrary to s1CMA, the nature of what exactly constitutes\unauthorised"
in this context needs to be examined.
Early case law, before the common use of the Web estab-
lished some grounds for unauthorised access, the leading
case being R. v Allison which emphasised that it is pos-
sible for an employee to exceed their authority, even if they
are technically allowed to in the course of their job. This
would exclude an attack on the database of a website, since,
even though it is governed by permissions indicating who
can view what, attacking it to bypass the password protec-
tion (for example, in an attack like SQL injection) would
clearly be exceeding authority. A website is governed by In-
ternet protocols, which facilitate an implied level of consent.
A browser makes a request to the server, and it returns con-
tent along with a status code. If the request is ok, it will
return the content and a status code of 200, and if not it will
return a 403 status code and a Forbidden message. Some
case law suggests that it is slightly more complicated than
reliance on the protocols, however.
D.P.P. v Lennon[1] concerned a disgruntled (former) em-
ployee who crashed the mail server of his former boss by
sending a mail bomb
3. At rst instance, it was held by the
magistrate that there was no case to answer, since an email
server was designed to receive email. On appeal Keene LJ
held that they had erred, and that whilst there was consent
to receive emails, they would not have consented if asked
whether they could receive 500,000 emails simultaneously
and likened it to a householder not consenting\does not con-
sent to a burglar coming up his path [or] having his letter
box choked with rubbish"[1]. At around the same time, the
magistrate's court in R v Cuthbert[6] reached a dierent de-
cision. This case concerned a security professional who was
concerned about whether he had been victim of a phishing
attack following a donation to the DEC, so he attempted
a directory traversal attack to see if he could discover if it
was a phishing site or not. He appended ../../../ which
causes the page requested to go \up" three directories into
the underlying directory structure, and was found guilty un-
der s1.
Whilst the limit to consent from Lennon is sensible, we are
still left in some doubt as to what exactly the limit to con-
sent is. Cuthbert has no legal precedence, because it was
only a magistrates court decision, but it does show the will-
ingness of the CPS to prosecute in these sort of cases. This
might be simply theoretical, and the CPS might make a
dierent decision nine years later, but uncertain law can
have an unfortunate impact as some cases in the USA have
shown. In January 2013 Aaron Swartz committed suicide
whilst facing charges relating to computer fraud and wire
fraud for writing a script to bulk download journals from
the JSTOR repository. Following his death, a bill was pro-
posed to limit the scope of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA)[3]. Another case was that of Andrew Auern-
heimer who was found guilty under CFAA for downloading
customers' email addresses from an unprotected Web page
causing AT & T to close the security hole which made this
possible. This was recently overturned on appeal, but the
3This case would now be tried under s3A CMA, which now
makes impairment of a computer an oence following the
Police and Justice Act 2006
court chose { despite the importance of the issues { to ignore
them and decide it on the safer option of \venue"[7]
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS
The fear relating to broadly dened laws in this area is usu-
ally more of an issue to security researchers who risk prose-
cution, but does apply to Web scientists as well. Web Sci-
ence is not solely concerned with the thoughts and feelings
of people on the Web, but on the implications or impacts of
certain behaviours on the Web in particular in relation to
cybercrime. The lack of data which exists in order to vali-
date (or not) survey results means that more direct research
is occasionally needed, which could have a danger of con-
travening the CMA. For example, in attempting to screen
scrape a website where the robots.txt le doesn't grant
permission
4 could be considered unauthorised. Similarly,
the connection between malware and cybercrime might lead
a researcher to consider what exactly makes the research
possible. Investigating to what degree servers are congured
correctly could involve making requests to publicly accessi-
ble but hidden pages. The recent \heartbleed" scare led to
many researchers performing scans on popular websites, for
example https://zmap.io/heartbleed/, to see how many
had patched the vulnerability. Whilst clearly not malicious,
performing a public service, and obtaining relevant data,
could attempting toexploit an OpenSSL vulnerability really
be considered consistent with the CMA?
Generally speaking, these provisions are unlikely to pose a
problem to a researcher as long as they are aware that they
exist. Yet, as the Auernheimer case shows, judges are not
inspiring condence about their understanding by sidestep-
ping the important issues relating to computer misuse. A
risk averse institution could conceivably decide not to back
a researcher where laws might be broken, so it is impor-
tant that researchers are aware of the limits of these laws
(as much as possible) so as to be able to argue that their
research should be permitted (and not end up in jail).
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4See http://www.robotstxt.org/ for details about the pro-
tocol